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Abstract 
In the very recent past, the economics of the household and the economics of 
development appear to be edging toward a new convergence of concern around the 
nature and use of assets.  However, these two literatures of economics continue to exist 
in separate spheres.  I draw from both bodies of literature in order to examine gender 
differences in asset portfolios.  I find systematic differences in the way that certain assets 
held by husbands versus wives influence household decision outcomes. A clear 
understanding of the nature and functions of various types of assets in hands of husbands 
and wives is necessary to better understand the gendered impacts of economic and social 
institutions in developing countries.   
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I.  Introduction 
 In the very recent past, the economics of the household and the economics of development 
appear to be edging toward a new convergence of concern around the nature and use of assets, 
particularly by populations that are conventionally thought of as “poor.”  This new convergence 
could be strongly connected to different ways in which assets strengthen individuals’ positions in 
different institutions.  In the developmental economics literature, scholars are concerned with the 
influential role of economic and social institutions in establishing individuals’ economic positions 
and how their interactions with assets potentially alter their economic and societal positions. 
Alternately, scholars of household economics concentrate on the institutional effects of family 
dynamics on economic resource allocation within the household and how assets determine the 
distribution of household economic resources.  However, neither of the two literatures has fully 
incorporated each other’s way of thinking about the nature and use of assets into their own 
respective analyses.   
 Although these two literatures of economics continue to exist in separate spheres of 
economics, an intrahousehold approach that focuses on the nature of and use of assets can 
potentially bridge the gap between economics of household and of development.  The 
intrahousehold approach is concerned with the household unit and its decision-making processes 
about material needs, therefore assets serve as crucial links between the nexus of developmental 
economics and household economics because they allow cultural, political, social, and economic 
institutions to enter into household decision-making processes about economic resources 
allocation.  Hence, institutional structures of developing economies may influence household 
dynamics through household members’ possession of assets. 
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 Inspired by this innovative idea, I will attempt to strengthen the relationship of “household 
economics” and “developmental economics” with intrahousehold thinking and my use of an asset 
analysis and a gender-based examination of the process of marital investment.  Moreover, this 
analysis will potentially further the convergence of household and development economics toward 
the nature and use of assets. The main question of this analysis is “how do wealth portfolios of 
human capital, physical capital, and precautionary assets affect the marital bargaining positions of 
husbands and wives in Indonesia?” With a clear understanding of the nature and use of various 
types of assets in hands of husbands and wives, policymakers can possibly improve economic, 
social, and familial well-beings of poor people and institutions in developing countries. 
 The original research of this article provides the intrahousehold literature with two 
important extensions.  First, I connect the intrahousehold marital bargaining literature to the 
developmental economics literature concerned with labor, credit, and insurance markets in order to 
show the relationship between husbands’ and wives’ wealth portfolios and marital bargaining 
positions.  The purpose of this particular nexus is to illustrate how different economic institutions 
may treat husbands and wives differently, which potentially influences their investment behaviors 
and hence their marital bargaining positions.   
 Second, I introduce an endogenous threat point into the marital bargaining model and 
specify its determinants as three categories of wealth.  My goal is to incorporate the effects of 
different social and economic constraints on husbands’ and wives’ investment strategies in a game-
theoretical economic framework. Thus, the game-theoretical approach may provide more insight 
into husbands’ and wives’ investment behaviors and bargaining positions within the household, 
given external social, cultural and economic market constraints. 
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 I focus on how human capital, physical capital, and precautionary assets affect the 
individual and relative marital health outcomes of husbands and wives.  The health outcome is a 
proxy for household health expenditure, so a disproportionate relative health outcome suggests that 
one individual gains more health care expenditure than his or her spouse does. 
 The article is divided into three major sections.  The first section discusses how social and 
environmental norms and parameters affect gender within economic structures, which may 
influence the investment behavior and marital bargaining positions of husbands and wives.  The 
second provides a Nash cooperative bargaining theoretical framework that models the marital 
investment behavior of husbands and wives.  Within this framework, I am able to derive basic 
demand functions and comparative statistics of husbands’ and wives’ health expenditures.  In the 
last section, I empirically test the effects of the three asset portfolios on husbands’ and wives’ 
health expenditure demand functions.  In the conclusion, I briefly summarize my results and 
analyze the policy implications of the study’s findings. 
II.  Gender and the “Household”  
Gender is not simply a “household” phenomenon, but operates at multiple levels 
of economy and society and is a pervasive element in the way all institutions are 
constructed and the dynamics through which they change (Hart 1995, 58). 
 
The above statement indicates the importance of gender in the interactions between 
intrahousehold processes and non-household institutions, and hence the outcomes of policy and 
economic changes.  In recent feminist economic literature, economists analyze the importance of 
gender in the development of economic, political, and social institutions and how its influences in 
these structures affect the dynamic of the “household.”   
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 In very recent intrahousehold literature, economists attempt to analyze how various assets 
possessed by the household head and spouse affect their bargaining positions in the household.  In 
Section II, I attempt to unite the literature about gender effects on social and economic structures 
with the intrahousehold literature about the household bargaining process.  I begin by presenting a 
brief history of household behavior models, which provides possible explanations about the 
favorability of the household bargaining model in relation to other household models.  In the 
second section, I concentrate on the household bargaining model in order to investigate the 
determinants of household bargaining positions.  In the third section, I analyze how different 
economic markets and social norms influence husbands’ and wives’ possession of assets, which is 
an important determinant of household bargaining positions.  In the last section, I conclude this 
section with a brief presentation of key feature of Indonesia’s economy and society, particularly 
emphasizing those aspects that influence the economic interactions of husbands and wives. 
A.  Brief History of Household Decision-Making Models  
 Economic analyses have treated the household as a black box in which the preferences of 
all household members can be aggregated into a single joint utility function (Becker 1991).  The 
unitary model of household behavior views the household as a collection of individuals who 
behave as if they agreed on how best to combine their time, goods purchased in the market, and 
goods produced at home.  The key advantage of a unitary framework is that it is relatively easy to 
analyze the impact of changes in policy and other relevant variables on a single agent’s behavior.  
Until recently, strong critiques of this unitary view of the household have come from sociologists, 
anthropologists, and non-neoclassical economists who insist on the importance of recognizing both 
conflict and cooperation in intrahousehold relations (Hart 1995).  
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 The unitary model has two important limitations.  First, the model can allow prices to differ 
for various household members, but it assumes that all household resources (capital, labor, and 
land) are pooled (Alderman 1995, 3).  This assumption requires that at least one member of the 
household is able to monitor the other members and to sanction those who fail to comply with the 
household rules, which are both issues of information and control.   Second, the unitary model 
assumes that there is a single set of preferences guiding how resources are distributed within the 
household.  This unitary preference assumption implies that household members are fully 
cooperative and conflicts among household members do not exist, which may be a simplification 
of household dynamics.   
 Over the past years, the emergence of the household bargaining model during the 1980s has 
stirred debate between the approaches of unitary and collective models of the household.  The 
major thrust of the debate is whether individuals should be characterized by their own preferences, 
rather than aggregated as one unit.  Collective modeling advocates believe that individualism 
should be preserved when modeling household behavior.  Therefore, most collective modelers 
view rules that influence intrahousehold allocation as having multiple forms, which is a completely 
separate view from the unitary view.   
 The main advantage of collective modeling is that intrahousehold and interhousehold 
relations are the basic focus of the research.  Rather than simply shifting from the household to 
individual, there is a need to focus on relationships within and among households, as well as in 
non-household institutions, and on the way these relationships are defined in terms of gender (Hart 
1995, 58).   
 The collective models can be categorized into two broad groups: non-cooperative models 
which allow for informational asymmetries and enforcement problems, and are generally not 
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Pareto optimal, and cooperative models which conform to Pareto-optimality (Hart 1995, 58). The 
non-cooperative approach (Ulph 1988; Carter and Katz 1992; Lundberg and Pollak 1993) relies on 
the assumption that individuals cannot enter into binding agreements and enforceable contracts 
with each other.  Instead, individuals’ actions are conditional on the actions of others.  For 
instance, Lundberg and Pollak’s non-cooperative model specifies that each spouse makes decisions 
within his or her sphere and responds to the other’s decisions by altering their level of voluntary 
contributions to shared goods.   
 On the other hand, the cooperative approach assumes that individuals form a household 
when it is more beneficial to them than remaining alone.  Higher benefits could occur because the 
formation of a household may be a more efficient way to produce or share household goods that 
single individuals cannot.  Some cooperative models impose structure by representing the 
household decision as an outcome of some specific bargaining processes (Alderman 1995, 5).  
Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) create a bargaining framework that 
envisages the household as composed of self-interested individuals whose preferences are different 
from one another.  The Nash formulation of the bargaining problem, which is widely used to model 
household behavior, entails both conflict and cooperation.  At the core of the bargaining model is 
the “threat point,” which represents the level of utility that each individual will attain if they do not 
cooperate.  The threat point is defined in terms of extra-environmental parameters such as 
demographic, legal, and other macroeconomic conditions external to the household.  Furthermore, 
it is not credible in the context of small daily decisions for either spouse to threaten the other with 
divorce.   
 The household modeling approaches greatly depend on different household structures.   In 
this analysis, the Nash household bargaining model will be used to represent Indonesia’s household 
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decision-making process.  The reasons why this model is utilized will be evident later in this 
section. 
B.  Determinants of Household Bargaining Positions  
 In most household models, husbands and wives, explicitly or implicitly, are struggling to 
increase the welfare of the household and their personal welfare.  In the household bargaining 
model, the struggle between husband and wife for household resources is more apparent than in 
other models.  With each household member striving to increase their own utility, the household 
may experience numerous conflicts about the allocation of household resources.  Typically, power 
relations determine who receives the household resources, and in what quantity he or she receives 
them.   In this section, I will examine what establishes the bargaining positions of husbands and 
wives within households.   
 Before I begin the discussion of how bargaining positions are determined, I would like to 
present an example of the household bargaining process that illustrates the role of power in 
resolving conflicts.  For instance, the household head and spouse may gather together to decide on 
the amount of education each child will receive in the current year.  The individual who can make 
their “voice” heard by the other individual tends to have the majority of power for allocating 
particular amounts of educational resources to their children.  The strength of one’s “voice” is 
simply that individual’s bargaining power, which determines the share of the resources allocated to 
an individual within the household.  Due to the severity of their discussion, the household head and 
spouse may attempt to persuade the other individual by threatening to leave the household, refusing 
to provide other resources, and not cooperating with future agreements.   
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 If more bargaining power can potentially help an individual to obtain a greater share of 
household resources, then what determines the amount of bargaining power an individual 
possesses? Agnes Quisumbing and John Maluccio (1999, 13) provide us with an answer by 
indicating four important determinants of marital bargaining power.  The first determinant is the 
mobilization of an interpersonal network.  By holding membership in organizations, accessing 
kinships and social networks, and owning other “social capital,” an individual may improve his or 
her bargaining position.  For example, an individual with social relationships may be able to rely 
on the group’s assistance if he or she decides to end his or her marriage or not to cooperate in the 
marriage.  Mobilization of an interpersonal network strengthens the credibility of an individual’s 
threats. 
 The second determinants are the factors that can be used to influence the bargaining 
process.  Some factors that may influence the bargaining process are legal rights, laws, skills and 
knowledge, bargaining skills, the capacity to acquire information, and education (Quisumbing and 
Maluccio 1999, 14).  Most of these factors are external to individuals, but some are highly 
correlated with human capital.  In some instances, domestic violence may be used to extract 
resources from spouses or their families (Kabeer 1994). 
 The third determinant is basic attitudinal attributes.  Self-esteem, self-confidence, and 
emotional satisfaction can empower individuals to pursue their best interest.  The Grameen Bank is 
a successful group-credit program because it empowers women with confidence.  Several non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) have made individuals aware of laws, political participation, 
and the use of contraception. 
 The last determinant is individual control over economic resources.  The threat of 
withdrawing both oneself and one’s economic resources from the household grants the owner of 
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those resources some power over household resources (Quisumbing and Maluccio 1999, 13).  
Economic analysis of bargaining power tends to focus on economic resources exogenous to labor 
supply as a major determinant of bargaining positions. 
 Among the four determinants of bargaining positions, the effects of controlling certain 
economic resources on individual bargaining positions have been the most widely tested 
empirically.  For instance, Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) investigate the effect of women’s income 
share on the allocation of household expenditures in Cote d’Ivoire.  Thomas (1990) also tests the 
collective model by examining the effects of unearned income of men and women on nutrient 
intakes, fertility and child survival, and child anthropometrics.  Schultz (1990) analyzes the 
differential effects of males’ and females’ unearned income on labor supply and fertility in 
Thailand.  In addition, Quisumbing (1994) examines the intrahousehold distribution of land and 
education as a function of father’s and mother’s education and inherited landholdings in the 
Philippines.  Doss (1996) investigates the effects of current assets on the distribution of 
expenditure among different consumption categories in Ghana.  Thomas, Contreras, and 
Frankenberg (1999) test the effects of maternal and paternal assets at marriage on child health in 
Indonesia. 
C. Economic Markets Constrain Household Bargaining Positions   
In the household economics literature, economists believe that individual control over 
certain economic resources can greatly influence the bargaining positions of husbands and wives.  
However, few economists have analyzed how individuals are constrained to gain possession of 
certain economic resources.  In this section, I will examine how the labor market, credit market, 
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insurance market, and social boundaries in developing countries may affect husbands’ and wives’ 
economic behavior, which will inevitably alter their bargaining positions.   
The Labor Market 
 Knowing that labor markets in developing countries are imperfect, how does this 
imperfection affect the labor decisions of husbands and wives?1  This question is relevant for two 
main reasons.  The first reason is that certain labor decisions may explain why individuals possess 
certain economic resources and form certain economic relationships.  The second reason is that 
husbands’ and wives’ labor decisions reflect certain social constraints, in addition to imperfect 
labor market constraints. 
 In recent empirical evidence, developmental economists indicate that males and females in 
developing countries may work in different sectors of the labor market.  Hirata and Humphrey 
(1991, 678) report that 64.7 percent of Brazilian males continue working in the formal labor sector 
after a formal sector job loss, while 60.8 percent of Brazilian females move to the informal labor 
sector after a similar job loss.  Joycelin Massih (1990, 229) describes the daily work activities of 
females in Barbados, Antigua, and Saint Vincent.  Massih indicates that more than 50 percent of 
females in these countries performed no formal work but only household work, which includes 
domestic chores, childcare, care of domestic pets, care of the aged and infirm, and agricultural 
production for home use.  Carmen Diana Deere and Magdalena Leon de Leal (1982, 74-5) indicate 
that 97 percent of male temporary agricultural laborers in Colombia receive some kind of payment, 
while only 3 percent of Colombian female temporary agricultural laborers receive some type of 
payment. 
                                                          
1 In Debra Ray's Developmental Economics (1999, 487-88), there is a clear presentation of the imperfections of labor markets in 
developing countries. 
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 Two prominent explanations for the labor behavior of husbands and wives are the 
following: the sectoral comparative advantage theory and the breadwinner theory.  The first 
explanation, pioneered by Gary S. Becker, is the theory of comparative advantages in sectoral labor 
markets.  Becker asserts that females typically work in the household since the biological 
difference of child-bearing temporary forces them out of the labor market.  Their absence in the 
formal labor market provides their husbands with relatively more work knowledge and experience.  
According to Becker’s theory of comparative advantage, it is efficient for husbands to completely 
specialize their time allocation in and investment related to the formal labor market, while wives 
completely specialize their time allocation in and investment related to the informal labor market.   
 In contrast to Becker’s theory, the breadwinner theory uses social norms to better explain 
the labor decisions of husbands and wives.  Helma Hirata and John Humphrey (1991) begin their 
argument by asserting that males are typically perceived as breadwinners who are responsible for 
having steadier incomes and fewer job separations than females.  This generally implies that males 
acquire their jobs in the formal labor market where high wages and fringe benefits, good working 
conditions, low labor turnover, and a high probability of job mobility exist (Rothboeck and 
Acharya 1999, 585).  This particular financial pressure causes males to continue to work in the 
formal labor sectors.  Unlike males, females lack substantial pressure to be household providers, 
which allows them to enter and exit the formal and informal labor markets freely.   
 Although no one complete explanation for husbands’ and wives’ labor decisions exists, it is 
clear, given the empirical evidence, that husbands typically decide to participate in the formal labor 
market, while  wives typically participate in the informal labor market.  These sectoral segregation 
patterns may cause husbands and wives who work in different labor markets to potentially 
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accumulate capital relevant only to their respective sectors.  The implication of this scenario is that 
individual asset portfolios can potentially vary systematically across husbands and wives.  
The Credit Market 
In developing countries, the availability of labor income can be quite uncertain, which 
causes most individuals to smooth their incomes over time through the use of credit.  However, 
credit markets in developing countries have the two fundamentally problematic features of 
involuntary and strategic defaults on loans, which result from asymmetrical information and 
inappropriate incentive mechanisms.  With the market failures and imperfections that exist in a 
developing economy’s credit markets, it is pertinent that we ask how husbands’ and wives’ 
economic behaviors are influenced by imperfect credit markets. 
 First, I would like to present testimonial evidence to indicate a distinction in husbands’ and 
wives’ participation in the formal and informal credit markets.  Muhammad Yunus (1995, 16-17) 
indicates that females in developing countries are limited to informal credit markets based on their 
access to collateral. Yunus provides us with a typical scenario in Bangladesh about females’ access 
to the formal banking system with the following quote: 
One of the allegations that I was bringing against the banking system was that it was 
designed to be anti-poor.  That’s why they built the wall of collateral.  It was also 
the allegation that it was anti-women.  Banks do not want to lend money to women.  
If woman wants to borrow from a bank, the manager will ask the woman to bring 
her husband along, so that he can discuss the business (Yunus 1995, 17).  
 
His observation provides us with evidence of the existence of gender biases in the formal credit. In 
addition, it indicates that husbands possess collateral, which makes them more welcome than 
wives. Hence, husbands typically participate in the formal credit market, while wives usually 
participate in the informal credit market.   
14 
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 Besides the evidence displaying husbands’ and wives’ participation in different credit 
markets, other empirical evidence also indicates that husbands and wives own different forms of 
collateral. Husbands typically possess the property rights for land, houses, tractors, financial 
accounts, and automobiles (Quisumbing and De la Briere 2000, Dolan, 2001, Quisumbing 2001).  
Wives in developing countries usually possess jewelry, small animals, clothing, and household 
durables (Watson and Ebrey 1991, Watson and Ebrey, 1991, Massiah 1993, Kabeer 1994, Guyer 
1997, Zongmin 1999, Quisumbing 2000).   
 Even though the literature about credit markets does not provide direct causal relationships 
between ownership of certain collaterals and participation in certain credit markets, the empirical 
evidence clearly indicates that husbands own relatively more formal forms of collateral and 
participate more often in formal credit markets than wives do.  This strong correlation between 
different forms of collateral and different credit market participation may be a result of being 
restricted to a particular credit market.  If this hypothesis is true, then the gender bias of credit 
markets can potentially cause husbands and wives to possess different assets. 
The Insurance Market 
 Poor individuals in developing countries face several sources of unexpected variations in 
their incomes and consumption levels.  As a precautionary measure, individuals would like to 
acquire insurance to smooth their income and consumption patterns in case credit and labor income 
is unavailable.  However, formal insurance is typically not provided to poor individuals due to the 
market failures of moral hazard and adverse selection.  Formal insurance providers have limited 
information about their customers and limited enforcement mechanisms. The social dynamics of 
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informal insurance markets allow mutual insurance groups to form, which minimize the 
informational barrier between providers and recipients.2 
 In informal insurance markets, individuals tend to insure themselves by having self-
insurance—the use of one’s own wealth to smooth uncertain shocks transferred to individuals who 
maintain strong social relationships with other in income and consumption—and mutual 
insurance—group-based wealth members (Morduch 1997, 7).  The question arises of whether 
males and females can use the same kinds of assets to smooth their consumption patterns. 
 Recent literature suggests not.  Husbands and wives typically rely on different forms of 
informal insurance to smooth their consumption patterns (Quisumbing 1994).  In developing 
countries, husbands tend to possess saving accounts, social relationships with formal market 
employers, various plots of land, and buildings (Doss 1996).  On the other hand, wives tend to 
possess jewelry, communal social relationships, small livestock, clothing, and ceremonial 
equipment (Quisumbing 2000).    
Social Boundaries 
How a group or society distributes available resources among members reflects not 
only power and authority relations, but also the moral basis of the group, its 
consensus about distributive justice, and its implicit priorities (Papenek 1990, 163).   
 
The above statement suggests that resource allocation among a group is not merely linked to 
power, but linked also to entitlements and property rights.  These entitlements and property rights 
are based on social consensus and the process of childhood socialization.  In developing countries, 
a bigger share of household resources may signal an imbalance in power or status.  Or a bigger 
share of household resources may have always been given to a certain person due to social norms.  
                                                          
2 Social pressure rather than legal contracts or laws usually plays a greater role in enforcing insurance arrangements in small 
communities than in large communities. 
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In this section, I investigate how entitlements and property rights in developing countries may 
potentially affect the marital distribution of resources and power between males and females.  
In the developmental economic literature, land and dowries have been two resources in 
which social norms most clearly determine their ownership among husbands and wives.   Generally 
in developing countries, husbands tend to own the majority of land (Doss 1996; Lich 1999).  For 
instance, John Bruce (1993, 46) infers that the vast majority of African tenure systems gives 
females access to land not in their own right but as their husbands’ wives or as daughters or sisters.  
While females may have a right to own a particular portion of land, they by no means have control 
of it.  Furthermore, females in developing countries continue to possess the majority of their 
dowries during and after marriage.  Nalia Kabeer (1994, 154) suggests that a woman is entitled at 
the time of her marriage to various kinds of moveable assets (utensils, jewelry, cash) donated by 
both her own and her husband’s family.    
 Social norms in developing countries shape the way an individual thinks the world works.  
During childhood, an individual may have been taught that the father should receive the largest 
portion of food in the family.  Or perhaps, one child should be sent to school, while the others stay 
at home.  Individuals learn at an early age that certain individuals are entitled to particular 
resources because the society has decided that the behavior is appropriate.  The society may 
implicitly or explicitly determine the acceptability of individuals receiving certain property rights 
due their perception of the ideal society.  These specifications of property rights and social norms 
may affect the ownership of certain assets by males and females, which can potentially influence 
power relations in the household through external channels. 
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D.  Economic Features and Household Dynamics in Indonesia 
 The insights offered by the literature shed light on husbands’ and wives’ investment 
strategies and bargaining positions. In this section, I will present an analysis of how key economic 
and societal features in Indonesia potentially influence economic interactions of husbands and 
wives.  First, I will begin my analysis by briefly describing Indonesia’s economy, emphasizing the 
gender differences in the economy.  Second, I will examine the dynamics of a husband and wife 
within the household.   
 The economic conditions in Indonesia are typical of many of the developing countries in 
East Asia and the Pacific countries. Its GNP per capita in terms of U.S dollar was 580 in 1999.  In 
addition, 70 percent of children under age 5 experienced malnutrition, compared to only 13 percent 
in East Asia and the Pacific in 2000.3   However, the percent of labor force participation in 
Indonesia is 2.5 compared to 1.4 percent in other East Asian and Pacific countries.  The illiteracy 
rate in 2000 was 4 percentage points higher in Indonesia than in other East Asian and Pacific 
countries.4  Moreover, 19 percent of Indonesian adult females were illiterate in 1999, while only 9 
percent of Indonesian adult males were.  Females only make up 41 percent of the labor force in 
Indonesia and more Indonesian males participate in the industrial sector than females do, which 
reflects differences in sectoral allocations.   
 In relation to the discussion in the former section, Indonesia’s key economic features can 
play a major role in structuring Indonesian household dynamics by influencing husbands’ and 
wives’ “voice.”  It is reported that females tend to have an equal “voice” in decisions regarding 
how important household matters will be settled, especially in decisions about the control of 
                                                          
3 The World Bank Organization's definition of child malnutrition is the percentage of children under age 5 whose weight for their 
age is less than minus 2 standard deviations from the median of the reference population. 
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household resources (Williams 1990, 35).  Linda Williams (1990, 35) reports that Indonesian 
males and females cooperate considerably in making household decisions.  Both males and females 
are engaged in some economic activities, such as agriculture and handicraft production.  
Furthermore, Ranta Saptari (2000, 13) indicate that most females’ “voice” have limitations in other 
domains of family decisions.  For instance, it is reported that most females lack “voice” regarding 
their family size (Williams 1990, 34). 
 Linda Williams (1990) describes marriage under the adat as a ritual which symbolizes the 
passing from both the man’s and the woman’s state of celibacy to the marital one.  The 
determination of marriage is based on how well it will benefit the two families, not on the 
preferences of the potential spouses.  In addition, marriage tends to be viewed as a duty, for which 
females must prove themselves worthy as a wife and mother and males must prove themselves 
worthy as a provider and father.  If an individual proves to be worthy and decides to separate, all 
the possessions brought to the marriage by each spouse remain with his or her respective family.  
Property acquired during the marriage is typically split so that the wife receives one third of its 
value, while her husband receives two thirds (Williams 1990, 36).   
E. Conclusion 
 The present review of the literature illustrates how economic institutions that are influenced 
by gender can possibly affect the economic activities and interactions of husbands and wives.  
More importantly, the economic environment beyond the household may potentially influence the 
dynamics within the households by constraining husbands and wives differently.  The following 
sections will provide a theoretical model and empirical analysis which permits formal testing of 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
4 Data was collected from the World Bank Organization on the access date of 4/10/02.  The website URL is 
http://www.worldbank.org. 
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these assertions.  This investigation is useful for an understanding of how economic and social 
structures affect the intrahousehold decision-making process. 
III. Theoretical Framework of Household Dynamics 
The bargaining process thus generates intersecting contractual relationships 
between different household members, specifying their rights and obligations 
to each other, as the basis of household cooperation (Kabeer 1994, 109).  
 
According to the above statement, a bargaining theoretical framework provides a 
representation of how household members that are interdependent on one another cooperate as a 
unit through the establishment of different bargaining relationships.  In this section, I formulate 
how husbands' and wives' ownership of human capital, physical capital, and precautionary savings 
can potentially influence bargaining positions in the household by changing their interdependence 
on each other.  Beginning with the marital bargaining theory set forth by Manser and Brown and 
McElroy and Horney, I present my marital bargaining framework that incorporates human capital, 
physical capital, and precautionary savings into the analysis through individuals' threat points.  I 
also derive the demand functions and comparative statics of husbands' and wives' health 
expenditure, which provides important theoretical implications for my empirical analysis. 
 Before I present my marital bargaining model, I would like to provide two important 
reasons for the inclusion of human capital, physical capital, and precautionary assets in husbands’ 
and wives’ threat points.  The first reason is that human capital, physical capital, and precautionary 
assets are major components of each individual’s wealth portfolio and threat point.  Human and 
physical capital are viewed as personal investments that increase an individual’s future 
productivity and earnings (Miller and Watts 1967, 375). Alternately, precautionary assets serve as a 
suitable mechanism to preserve individual’s potential earnings in times of financial emergencies.  
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 The second reason is that human capital, physical capital, and precautionary assets as 
separate determinants of the threat point, allow us to more comprehensively consider how different 
economic markets and social boundaries may affect husbands’ and wives’ bargaining positions.  
With the inclusion of these investments, we allow husbands’ and wives’ threat points to be 
influenced by a wider variety of economic and social factors. 
 Consider a household, composed of a husband and a wife that bargains over the terms of a 
binding agreement specifying each individual’s consumption.  I assume that husbands and wives 
have the same preferences over their own consumption patterns and time allocation between 
leisure and labor.  I also assume that husbands and wives have similar risk preferences.  
 I denote the levels of human and physical capital of adult i in a period as hi, ki where i = m, 
f.  In addition,  I denote ji as the level of precautionary assets of adult i.  The wealth rate is an 
increasing strictly concave function of precautionary assets, human, and physical capital: θi = θ (hi, 
ki, ji). 
 The components of the wealth portfolio are carefully described by the following definitions 
and characteristics.  First, I define human capital as factors of production that are “embodied” 
within an individual.  Education, work experience, and personal nutrition are typical forms of 
human capital.  Human capital tends to be quite mobile in the sense that it typically moves with 
you.  It is also virtually useless as collateral. Furthermore, human capital has uncontestable asset 
returns, low convertibility, and steady long-run returns.  
 Second, I define physical capital as factors of production that are physically used by 
individuals.  Land, tractors, houses, and large animals serve as examples of physical capital.  The 
main traits of physical capital are moderate liquidity, highly contestable asset returns, and 
usefulness as collateral.  Physical capital also has limited mobility and durability.   
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 Last, I define precautionary assets as assets that provide a source of wealth to individuals 
during financial downturns. I conceptualize precautionary assets to be used if the individual’s 
possessions of human and physical capital are inappropriate for the circumstances.  Even though 
precautionary assets do not directly increase production, they tend to assist in maintaining 
individual’s human capital and physical capital at a productive level in case of an emergency.  
Jewelry, social capital, small animals, and ceremonial goods are examples of precautionary assets.  
Precautionary assets are typically liquid, highly mobile and only moderately useful as collateral.   
A.  Endogenous Threat Points 
 In order to construct the marital bargaining model, the derivations of husbands’ and wives’ 
threat points are needed first.  I begin deriving husbands’ and wives’ threat points through the 
maximization of each husband’s and wife’s utility function subject to their respective budget 
constraint.  Then, I derive each individual’s indirect utility function by solving for each 
individual’s optimal level of goods as a function of prices and assets, and plugging them into their 
respective utility functions.  These indirect utilities are simply husbands’ and wives’ threat points, 
which represent their utilities if a divorce occurs. 
 The von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences of the individual are represented as Ui(Xi) 
which is the function of private consumption of x goods of an adult of sex i where i = m, f.  Neither 
leisure and work time nor household public goods are considered in this simple model.  I also do 
not restrict the prices husbands and wives face to simply to be equal. 
 Using the Lagrangian maximization technique, the first-order conditions of each 
individual’s utility functions are shown below:  
max ( ) [ ( , , ) ]
,x x
i i i i i i i
m f
L U x h k j x p= + −λ θ
              (1) 
Husbands      
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                   ∂∂
∂
∂ λ
L
x
U
x
p
m
m
m
m= − = 0                              (2) 
                   
∂
∂λ θ
L h k j x pm m m m m m= − =( , , ) 0
              (3) 
Wives 
    
∂
∂
∂
∂ λ
L
x
U
x
p
f
f
f
f= − = 0
                             (4) 
   
∂
∂λ θ
L h k j x pf f f f f f= − =( , , ) 0
                (5) 
 
Now, we express individual optimal levels of goods as functions of prices and assets, and enter 
them into each individual’s respective original utility.  This process lead to male’s and female’s 
threat points, which are functions of respective prices and assets. 
   V V p h k jm m m m m m= ( , , , )                 (6) 
   V V p h k jf f f f f f= ( , , , )                 (7) 
The threat points of males and females represent the utility obtained independent of cooperating in 
the marriage. 
B.  Basic Model 
The Nash cooperative bargaining model for a two-person household is described as follows: 
Maximize U x V p h k j U x V p h k j
xm x f
m m m m m m m f f f f f f f,
[ ( ) ( , , , )] [ ( ) ( , , , )]− • −
 
subject to           
x p x p h k j h k jm m f f m m m m f f f f+ = +θ θ( , , ) ( , , )  and U Vi i>
where  
i m f= ,  
V p h k ji i i i i( , , , ) = individual’s threat point  
xi = vector of goods  
pi = market price vector of consumption  
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θ θi i i ih k j= ( , , ) = individual’s function of wealth.  
C.  Solutions 
According to the Lagrangian maximization technique, the first-order necessary condition of the 
Nash bargaining problem lead to the following solutions:   
L U m x m Vm pm hm km jm U f x f V f p f h f k f j f m hm km jm f h f k f j f xm pm x f p f= − • − + + − −[ ( ) ( , , , )] [ ( ) ( , , , )] [ ( , , ) ( , , ) }λ θ θ  
∂
∂
∂
∂ λ
L
x
U
x
U x V p h k j p
m
m
m
f f f f f f f m= • − − =[ ( ) ( , , , )] 0
  (8) 
∂
∂
∂
∂ λ
L
x
U
x
U x V p h k j p
f
f
f
m m m m m m m f= • − − =[ ( ) ( , , , )] 0
               (9) 
∂
∂λ θ θ
L h k j h k j x p x pm m m m f f f f m m f f= + − − =( , , ) ( , , ) 0
  (10) 
To satisfy the traditional second order sufficient conditions, the Hessian bordered matrix needs to 
be negative definite.  In order to determine whether this Hessian bordered matrix is negative 
definite, we can simply evaluate whether the determinant of this matrix is greater than zero 
(Silberberg 1990, 175).  
H
L L g
L L g
g g
xm xm xm x f xm
x f xm x f x f x f
xm x f
=
−
−
− −





0               (11) 
In the above Hessian bordered matrix, I denote g to represent the following equation: θm (hm , km , 
jm)  + θf (hf , kf , jf) - xmpm -xfpf.   Using Cramer’s rule, the calculation for the determinant of the 
Hessian matrix is illustrated below.   
H
L L g
L L g
g g
L
L g
g L
L g
g g
L L
g g
xmxm xmx f xm
x f xm x f x f x f
xm x f
xmxm
x f x f x f
x f
xmx f
x f xm x f
x f
xm
x f xm x f x f
x f x f
=
−
−
− −
=
−
−
−
−
−
−
− −
0
0 0
(12) 
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Under the assumption of diminishing marginal utilities for males and females Lxm,xm < 0and Lxf,xf < 
0) exists, the determinant of the Hessian matrix is positive.  Thus, the Hessian matrix is negative 
definite. 
 This maximization subject to the full joint budget constraint yields the following demand 
functions for food, health, education, and etc., X*: 
   X X p p h h k k j jm m f m f m f m fm=
* ( , , , , , , , )                      (13) 
           X X p p h h k k j jf f m f m f m f mf=
* ( , , , , , , , )                     (14)               
    λ λ=
*( , , , , , , , )p p h h k k j jf m f m f m f m                            (15) 
These demand functions not only include prices, but also the investments of both individuals.  This 
illustrates how husbands’ assets can affect their own demand functions and their wives’ demand 
functions, and vice versa for wives. 
 Not only does the theoretical bargaining framework tells us what variables belong in the 
demand expenditure functions, it also reveals the theoretical relationships between the demand 
expenditure functions and their corresponding wealth-related variables through the mathematical 
methodology of comparative statics.  In this analysis, the comparative statics illustrates 
theoretically how husbands’ and wives’ health demand functions change, given a one-unit change 
in human capital, physical capital, and precautionary assets.  
 To formally present the theoretical relationships between husbands’ and wives’ wealth-
related variables and their health demand functions, we simply derive the comparative statics for 
human capital, physical capital, and precautionary assets, ∂X*/∂γi, where i denotes either husband 
or wife and γ denotes human capital, physical capital or precautionary assets.  
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 We begin our derivations of these comparative statics by substituting the husband's and 
wife's demand functions and the marginal utility of income presented above into the first-order 
condition equations. This substitution yields the following identities: 
U X X p p h h k k j j g X X p p h h k k j jxm m f m f m f m f xm m f m f m f m fm m m m( , , , , , , , , , ) ( , , , , , , , , , )
* * * *+ =λ 0   (16) 
U X X p p h h k k j j g X X p p h h k k j jx f m f m f m f m f x m f m f m f m fm m f m m( , , , , , , , , , ) ( , , , , , , , , , )
* * * *+ =λ 0   (17) 
         g X X p p h h k k j jm m m f m f m f m f( , , , , , , , , , )
* *
= 0 . (18) 
  Since we are interested in changes in the health demand functions of husbands and wives as 
husbands' and wives' human capital, physical capital, and precautionary assets change, we 
differentiate the above identities with respect to each individual's asset.  As a result of the 
differentiation, I can presented the below matrix equation where γ denotes human capital, physical 
capital and precautionary assets and i =m, f: 
L L g
L L g
g g
X
X
L
L
g
xmxm xmx f xm
x f xm x f x f x f
xm x f
m
i
f
i
i
x
x
m
f
−
−
− −












=
−
−





0
∂
∂γ
∂
∂γ
∂λ
∂γ
γ
γ
γ
*
*
*
. 
Using Cramer’s rule, a change in husbands’ health expenditure, given one-unit change in the value 
of their husbands’ assets equals the following expression: 
∂
∂γ
γ
γ
γ
X
L L g
L L g
g g
Hm
m
xm xmx f xm
x f x f x f x f
x f
* ,
,=
− −
− −
−
•
−
0
1
. 
The theoretical relationship of husbands’ assets on their health demand expenditure are positive, 
since |H| > 0, gγ always > 0 and diminishing marginal utilities exist.  In addition, a change in 
wives’ health outcome given a one-unit change in the value of their assets also equals 
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∂
∂γ
γ
γ
γ
X
L L g
L L g
g g
Hf
f
xmx f xm xm
x f x f x f x f
x f
*
=
− −
− −
− −
•
−
0
1
. 
Similar to the comparative statics for husbands, the expected signs of wives’ wealth related 
explanatory variables on their health outcome are for the same reasons as husbands.  
 Guided by our intuition, we can be certain that these mathematical relationships are 
consistent with household bargaining theory.  First, our intuition tells us that an individual's 
wealth-related variables have positive relationships with his or her health expenditure.  A change in 
the value of an individual's wealth-related variables increases his or her threat point as well as 
weaken his or her spouse's threat point.  With a higher threat point, the individual has more 
bargaining power, which leads to a  higher level of household health expenditure.  Second, our 
intuition indicates that an individual's wealth related variables have inverse relationships with his 
or her spouse's threat point.  For instance, an increase in the value of an individual's wealth-related 
variable increase his or her threat point, which raise his or her bargaining power.  With a higher 
bargaining position, the individual has a stronger "voice" in the household and acquires a relatively 
larger share of household health expenditure, and hence lowers his or her spouse's share of 
household health expenditure. 
D.  The Empirical Implications 
The theoretical bargaining framework presents us with two major empirical implications.  
The first implication is that husbands’ and wives’ health demand functions consist of both of their 
assets and prices.  The second implication is that an individual’s health outcome should increase as 
the value of their assets increases.  In addition, his/her health outcome should decrease as the value 
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of their spouse’s asset increases.  In the empirical section, I attempt to investigate whether the 
second theoretical implication typically holds true. 
Specifically, the expected signs of these comparative statics correspond directly to 
statistical relationships between wealth-related variables and health demand functions of husbands 
and wives in the empirical analysis.  In the empirical section, we should expect the marginal effect 
estimates of husbands’ wealth-related variables with respect to their own demand functions to be 
positive, which corresponds with our comparative statics.  In addition, we should expect the 
marginal effect estimates of husbands’ wealth-related variables in relation to their spouses’ demand 
functions to be negative.  These relationships between the marginal effects estimates and the 
comparative statics correspond in a similar matter for wives.  Table 1 and 2 provide clear 
illustrations of the expected relationships between wealth-related variables and health demand 
functions of husbands and wives.  In the empirical section, I will apply my theoretical bargaining 
framework by empirically testing the effects of husbands’ and wives’ assets on their share of 
household health expenditures in Indonesia. 
IV.  Data Analysis and Empirical Methods  
 This section will summarize the data used, model selection, and empirical specifications.  I 
will begin with a description of the data and possible biases in the collection that may affect the 
results of the econometric analysis.  Second, I will describe the model selected to analyze the 
bargaining positions of husbands and wives in Indonesia.  Finally, I will describe the variables I 
chose to include in the models.  
A.  Data Analysis 
 The present analysis uses a continuing longitudinal socioeconomic and health survey, the 
Indonesia Family Life Survey, collected by the Rand Corporation.  The Indonesia Family Life 
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Survey (IFLS) is a sample representing about 83% of the Indonesian population living in 13 of the 
nation’s 26 provinces.  Moreover, the survey collects data on individual respondents, their families, 
their households, the communities in which they live, and the health and education facilities they 
use.    
 The data currently consists of two waves of the survey conducted in 1993 and 1997.  The 
first wave (IFLS1) was administered in 1993 to individuals living in 7,224 households. Four years 
later, 94% of the same households were interviewed again in the Indonesia Family Life Survey 2 
(IFLS2)5.   
 In the present analysis, Indonesia Family Life Survey 2 is used.  In the Indonesia Family 
Life Survey 2, household-level data is provided containing information on each household’s 
socioeconomic outcomes, nonlabor and labor incomes, and production activities.  In order to 
complement the household-level data and gain a better understanding of intrahousehold dynamics, 
the household questionnaires also included information about each individual’s educational and 
marital histories, asset ownership and nonlabor income, insurance coverage, health conditions, and 
household decision-making processes.  The total number of household-level observations in the 
data is 7,237 with over 20,000 individual-level observations. 
 I use data that pertains to the health outcomes of husbands and wives, husbands’ and wives’ 
share of economic resources, individuals’ demographics, and regions in Indonesia.   
 I restrict my analysis to a subsample composed of household heads and spouses.  There is 
one main reason for this restriction which is that the inclusion of other family members 
complicates the modeling of the martial bargaining process immensely. In my theoretical 
framework, the exclusion of additional family members from the marital bargaining analysis 
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allows us to focus on how husbands’ and wives’ investments affect their own and their spouse’s 
bargaining positions. 
 In order to construct a sample of homogenous households, my sample consists only of 
households with one male head and one female spouse.  My sample also only reflects households 
in which husbands are heads of the households.  Furthermore, my sample age distribution ranges 
between the ages of 20 and 65 because extreme cases of health outcomes may be correlated with 
younger and, particularly, older individuals.  In consequence of this process, my sample represents 
4,615 households with relatively homogenous health outcomes and household structures.   
Data Biases 
 
Figure 1 
 The conclusions drawn from my econometric analyses must be considered in light of both 
the methods of data collection and sampling of individuals.  In the Indonesia Family Life Survey, 
the sample does not fully represent the population distribution of Indonesia.  First, only 13 
provinces of Indonesia’s 26 provinces, which are shown in figure 1, are included in the IFLS2 
sample.  Second, the Indonesia Family Life Survey 2 sampled more urban and rural households in 
provinces other than Java, which contributes a large portion of Indonesia’s population.  We need to 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
5 The IFLS2 data survey can be accessed on the website: http://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/IFLS/index.html.   
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be a little skeptical about establishing conclusions that pertain to all husbands and wives in 
Indonesia. 
 In addition, the Indonesia Family Life Survey 2 may have obtained biased household- and 
individual-level data by only interviewing the head of the households.  In the survey, the household 
head reports his possession of economic resources and his spouse’s possession of economic 
resources.  This may cause the data to be biased because the household head may have based his 
answers on his perception of economic resources possessed by him and his spouse.  The husband 
may have also exaggerated his possessions relative to his wife’s to appear wealthier or more 
powerful or just simply out of embarrassment.  Hence, the actual possession of economic resources 
for some husbands and wives may not be correctly represented in the sample.   
B.  Empirical Methodology 
 In this section, I present the model that will be used in my analysis.  A probability analysis 
of the individual and relative marital health outcomes is performed using the ordered-probit 
estimation procedure. The use of this econometric method is an attempt to analyze and understand 
the impact of males’ and females’ investments on their individual health outcomes and relative 
marital health outcomes. 
Ordered-Probit Estimation Analysis 
Equation 1 
Headhealth Spousehealth Relativehealth = f(head price, spouse price, head human capital, spouse
human capital, head physical capital, spouse physical capital, head precautionary assets, spouse
precautionary assets)
 
 
As a result of my health dependent variables having several rankings, the ordered-probit 
estimation analysis was chosen to estimate how each of the explanatory variables affects the 
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dependent variables at each health status ranking.  For the ordered-probit estimation analysis, the 
individual and relative health outcomes of husbands and wives serve as the dependent variables 
representing household health expenditure.  In Section III, I demonstrate that husbands’ and wives’ 
demand functions not only depend on their assets and prices, but on their respective spouse’s assets 
and prices.  The basic demand specifications of husbands’ and wives’ assets and prices on their 
health outcomes are represented in equation 1.  
 Unlike the ordinary least-square coefficient estimation, estimates obtained through the use 
of ordered-probit estimation procedure cannot be interpreted simply as the direct effect of one unit 
change in the explanatory variable on the dependent variable.  Moreover, the marginal effects of 
explanatory variables need to be constructed for each ranking in order to interpret the ordered-
probit estimation results.  The ordered-probit marginal effect estimates indicates how the 
probability of a particular ranking of the dependent variable changes, given a one-unit change in 
the value of the corresponding explanatory variable.   
 In addition to being different from least-square estimates, the calculations of the 
probabilities of certain outcomes occurring and the marginal effect estimates for an ordered-probit 
analysis are also different from those calculated in a probit analysis.  Intuitively, the probit 
marginal effect estimates represent the change in the probability of moving from one outcome to 
another outcome as a result of a unit change in the value of an explanatory variable.  However, the 
marginal effect estimates for an ordered-probit analysis simply represent a change in the 
probability of being in one outcome given a unit change in the value of an explanatory variable. 
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 The mathematical calculations of the probabilities and marginal effect estimates for an 
ordered-probit analysis are presented below.6  Assuming the error to be normally distributed across 
all observations, we can derive the following probabilities: 
   Prob(Health 1)= = − ′φ β( )x  
   Prob(Health 2)= = − ′ − − ′φ µ β φ β( ) ( )1 x x  
   Prob(Health 3)= = − ′ − − ′φ µ β φ µ β( ) ( )2 1x x  
   Prob(Health 4)= = − ′ − − ′φ µ β φ µ β( ) ( )3 2x x  
 
where µ 's are unknown parameters to be estimated with β.  The marginal effects of the explanatory 
variables, x, are calculated using the equation:  
     
∂
∂
Pr ( )ob y j=
x  
where j represents the health outcome, ranging between 1 and 4.   
Variables Specification 
 Health outcome is reported as an ordered variable; it is given a value of one if the 
individual reports to be very unhealthy in the current year, a value of two if the individual reports 
to be unhealthy, a value of three if the individual reports to be healthy, and a value of four if the 
individual reports to be very healthy.  The relative health outcome is also measured as an ordered 
variable which has values ranging between -3 and 3.  It is simply defined as the difference between 
the husband’s and wife’s health outcomes.  The relative health outcome is given a value of -3 if the 
wife’s reported health outcome is 4 (the highest value) and the husband’s reported health outcome 
is 1 (the lowest value),  a value of 0 if the reported health outcomes of husband and wife are equal 
                                                          
6 Greene (2000) provides a detailed analysis of ordinal estimation procedure, especially ordered probit in Section 19.8 in 
Econometric Analysis. 
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values, and a value of 3 if the husband’s reported health outcome is 4 (the highest value) and the 
wife’s reported health outcome is 1 (the lowest value). 
Measures of assets and other explanatory variables 
 The aim of the present analysis is to examine the impact of human and physical capital and 
precautionary assets on married individuals’ and their relative marital health outcomes in the 
household. Therefore, the household assets in the sample are divided into three categories of 
investment portfolios using the criteria discussed in Section III.  The first variable represents the 
value of physical capital owned by husbands and wives. The calculation of physical capital value is 
the division of the total reported value of multiple physical assets by the reported share ownership 
of the physical assets.  The physical capital category consists of values for farm assets, nonfarm 
assets, houses, other buildings, farm land, livestock, and vehicles.7  The justification for this 
particular group of assets is that each of these assets has the primary purpose of being used as 
physical factors of production.  
 The second variable represents human capital possessed by the household head and spouse, 
which is measured as the highest level of individual educational attainment.  The human capital 
variable is a discrete variable measured in years ranging between the values of 0 and 16; it is given 
a value of 6 if the individual completed primary school, a value of 9 if the individual completed 
junior high school, a value of 12 if the individual completed senior high school, and a value of 16 
if the individual completed college.8  Educational attainment serves as a suitable proxy for human 
                                                          
7 The classification of farm assets is composed of land, plants, animals, tractors, heavy equipment, and small tools.  In addition, the 
classification of nonfarm assets is composed of motor vehicles, boats, other vehicles, nonfarm equipment, supplies and 
merchandises, and off-season equipment. 
8 In the sample, several individuals repeated a grade and/or participated in a particular school level more than one time without 
graduating to the next school level.  I only assigned a year of education for a completed year of education. 
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capital because education is typically positively correlated with personal knowledge and 
experience, nutrition, and skills.  
 The third variable represents the value of precautionary assets owned by the household 
head and his spouse, which is computed similarly to the physical capital variable.  The 
precautionary asset category is composed of household appliances, savings, receivables, jewelry, 
and household furniture.  The rationale for the particular construction of the precautionary asset 
variable is that each of these assets has no productive use and provides a reserve against adverse 
outcomes.  For instance, Guyer (1997) discusses how diamonds can serve as wives’ personal 
jewelry.  However, a diamond can also serve as storage of past wealth that will be consumed in the 
future if necessary.    
 Prices of husbands’ and wives’ health expenditures are also major elements in the marital 
bargaining framework.  Health insurance coverage serves as a proxy for the price of health care in 
my analysis.  The reason for this particular proxy of health care price is that the IFLS survey does 
not provide information about the price of health care.  Hence, we assume that an individual who 
possesses health insurance pays a lower price for health care than an individual who does not 
possess health insurance.  As a raw proxy for health price, I can control for the impact of health 
care price on individual and relative health outcomes with this dichotomous variable representing 
insurance. 
 In the statistical summary table 3, the mean value, standard deviation, and median value of 
husbands’ and wives’ health outcomes and assets are provided.  The summary table 3 illustrates a 
general pattern that males in Indonesia on average possess more human and physical capital and 
precautionary assets than females.  The table also indicates that the health outcomes of males and 
females are, on average, the same.  Nevertheless, the percentage of males possessing health 
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insurance coverage (17.2%) is higher than the percentage of females covered by health insurance 
(11.5%). 
Besides the inclusion of assets and health care prices in my analysis, it is also important to 
control for inherent differences among individuals, households, and regions.  I control for age, 
rural regions, provinces, and religions.  In table 4, I provide a brief description of each variable 
controlling for age, rural regions, provinces, and religions.  Age is a discrete variable with yearly 
intervals.  The regional and religious explanatory variables are dichotomous variables. 
 Controlling for the age of males and females is an attempt to examine the impact of 
personal knowledge and skills acquired through life experience on individual and relative health 
outcomes.  Through the processes of learning- by-doing, working various jobs, and living in his 
environment, an individual obtains knowledge about how to produce and save more efficiently.  
The level of these tools possessed generally increases as an individual grows older.  Therefore, age 
serves as a measurement for human capital that can be obtained only through life lessons.  
 On the other hand, age is typically linked to an individual’s health outcome.  Generally, we 
expect the health condition of old individuals to be lower than for young individuals because the 
human body depreciates with time.  Thus, it is also reasonable to assume that an individual’s health 
status tends to be inversely correlated with his or her age. 
 Regional differences can influence individual health conditions and the type and share of 
investments an individual owns in the marriage.  Regions in Indonesia may differ with respect to 
the levels of wealth, major religions, major ethnicities, laws, farmland sizes, and population 
distributions based on age and sex.  Duncan Thomas (2000) believes that Java, Bali, and Sumatra 
are quite different from the rest of the Indonesia in his use of IFLS1 because women tend to 
possess more relative bargaining power through possession of premarital assets.  Therefore, in this 
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analysis, regional differences will be represented as 13 dichotomous variables of the 13 provinces 
in the original sample.  Each dichotomous variable is given a value of one if the household resides 
in that province and a value of zero if the household resides in other provinces. 
 Other explanatory variables attempt to examine the effects of household religious beliefs on 
health outcomes.  Certain religions may promote different value systems about ownership of assets 
and distribution of household economic resources.  Furthermore, religion may define males’ and 
females’ places in their society, which may lead them to certain investment behavior and health 
outcomes.   
  In table 5, the mean value, standard deviation, and median value of each control 
explanatory variable are presented for husbands and wives.  On average, husbands in my sample 
are four years older than their wives.  In the table, we also find that 51.74 percent of the households 
in this sample reside in Indonesia’s urban regions.  This finding complies with the original study 
design criteria of providing an equal representative sample of urban and rural regions.  Only about 
40 percent of the households also live in the province of Java.  Aside from the province of Java, the 
provinces of North Sumatra and Jakarta each represent approximately 7 percent of the sample of 
this analysis.   Moreover, the most dominant religion for Indonesian households is Islam, distantly 
followed by Hinduism.  
V.  Empirical Results  
 In this section, I present my empirical results of the theoretical bargaining framework using 
the ordered-probit estimation procedures.  The empirical results of individuals’ and relative marital 
health outcomes from the ordered-probit analysis will be presented. The econometric estimation 
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method attempts to analyze and understand the impact of husbands’ and wives’ investments on 
their personal health outcomes and relative marital health outcomes.   
 At the beginning of my empirical analysis, I test whether the sample should be pooled or 
divided into rural and urban categories.  Using the likelihood test ratio, I cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the sample should be pooled at a significance level of .10 for any of my demand 
specifications.  Hence, the empirical results in this section reflect the pooled sample.  
Ordered-Probit Estimation Results of the Basic Demand Specifications 
 In the present section, I will present only the marginal effect estimates of husbands’ and 
wives’ basic demand specifications.  I find that coefficient estimates for both estimation analyses 
rarely change with respect to their level of significance and their values’ magnitude when we 
control for age, regional differences, and religious differences.  Therefore, I provide only the 
coefficient estimates of husbands',  wives', and relative marital full demand specifications along 
with the basic demand specifications in tables 6-8.   
 In  table 9, the marginal effects of one-unit value change on the probabilities of husbands 
existing in each health status given their own and their spouse’s assets and health care prices are 
presented.  First, the marginal effects of husbands' assets on the probabilities of each health 
outcome correspond with my expectations of asset-ownership improving their health status. 
However, only husbands’ physical capital has a statistically significant effect on the probabilities of 
husbands’ health status being healthy or unhealthy.  The marginal effect of a one-standard 
deviation change in husbands’ physical capital on the probability of being not very healthy is 
interpreted as a 0.525 percentage points decrease in the probability of husbands being not very 
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healthy at significant level of .10.9  In addition, a one standard deviation change in the value of 
husbands’ physical capital significantly increases the probability of husbands being healthy by 
0.648 percentage points. 
In figure 2, I illustrate graphically how much a one standard deviation increase in the value 
of husbands’ human capital, physical capital, and precautionary assets may cause the probability of 
husbands being in each health outcomes to differ from the baseline probability of husbands being 
in each health outcome.  The general pattern of husbands’ three wealth-related variables is that the 
probability of husbands being unhealthy decreases as the value of husbands’ wealth-related 
variables increases.  In addition, we observe that a one-standard deviation increase in husbands’ 
wealth-related variables corresponds with an increase in the probabilities of being healthy and very 
healthy.  Hence, husbands' wealth-related variables have positive relationships with their own 
health outcomes. 
Second,  the marginal effects of  wives' assets on the probabilities of each health outcome, 
except for physical capital, correspond with my expectations of spouses' asset-ownership 
decreasing their husbands' health status. In table 9, wives’ precautionary assets and human capital 
have statistically significant effects on the probabilities of husbands’ health status being healthy or 
unhealthy. The marginal effect of wives’ human capital on the probability of husbands being 
healthy suggests that a one-standard deviation increase in education for wives causes a 2.8 
percentage point decrease in the probability of males being healthy. 
 In figure 3, I provide a graphical representation of how much a one standard deviation 
increase in the value of wives’ human capital, physical capital, and precautionary assets may cause 
                                                          
9 One U.S. Dollar equals 3570.15 Indonesian Rupiahs in November 20, 1997.  The currency exchange was accessed on 
www.economists.com/markets/currency on April 19, 2002. 
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the probability of husbands being in each health outcomes to differ from the baseline probability of 
husbands being in each health outcomes. We can observe that one standard deviation increases in 
the value of wives’ human capital and precautionary assets increases the probability of their 
husbands being unhealthy and very unhealthy and also decreases the probability of their husbands 
being healthy and very healthy.  Both patterns of marginal effects estimates are consistent with my 
theoretical expectations of a negative relationship between husbands’ health outcomes and wives’ 
wealth-related variables.  The graph also indicates that wives’ physical capital is inconsistent with 
the theoretical expectations in section IV; however, this result does not have a statistically 
significant effect on husbands' health outcomes as shown in table 9.  
 In tables 10, the marginal effect estimates of one-unit change in husbands’ and wives’ 
assets on wives’ health demand function are presented. The marginal effects of husbands’ assets on 
wives’ health outcome probabilities confirm my expectation of spouse's asset-ownership 
decreasing their wives' health status.  However, none of the variables representing husbands’ assets 
and insurance prices have a significant effect on the probabilities on wives’ four health outcomes at 
level of .10.   
In figure 4, the graph illustrates how much a one standard deviation increase in the value of 
husbands’ human capital, physical capital, and precautionary assets may cause the probability of 
wives being in each health outcome to differ from the baseline probability of wives being in each 
health outcome.  The general pattern of these marginal effect estimates of husbands’ wealth-related 
variables on wives’ health outcomes is consistent with my theoretical expectations, which indicate 
that the relationships between husbands' wealth-related variables and wives' health status are 
inverse. 
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On the other hand, the marginal effects of  wives' assets on the probabilities of each health 
outcome, except for precautionary assets, does not correspond with my expectations of asset-
ownership improving their health status.  Only physical and human capital of wives have 
significant effects on their probabilities of being in each health category.  A one standard deviation 
increase in education for a wife causes a 5.05 percentage point increase in the probability of a wife 
being not very healthy and a .873 percentage point decrease in the probability of a wife being 
healthy at significance level of .10.  The probability of a wife being healthy decreases .111 
percentage points, given a one standard deviation change in their value of physical capital.  
 In figure 5, the graph illustrates how much a one standard deviation increase in the value of 
wives’ human capital, physical capital, and precautionary assets may cause the probability of wives 
being in each health outcome to differ from the baseline probability of wives being in each health 
outcome. The general patterns of human capital and physical capital are inconsistent with my 
theoretical expectations of wives’ human capital and physical capital improving wives’ health 
outcomes. Conversely, the positive statistical relationship between wives’ precautionary assets and 
their health outcomes is supported by my theoretical expectations. We must also keep in mind that 
these marginal effects are relatively small compared to their effects on husbands’ health outcomes. 
Ordered-Probit Estimation Results of the Relative Health Demand Specification 
 In tables 11a and 11b, I provide the marginal effects of a one-unit change in the value of 
individual’s assets and prices on the married couples’ relative health outcomes.  The marginal 
effects of husbands’ assets on the married couples’ relative health outcome probabilities confirm 
my expectation of husbands' asset-ownership decreasing their wives' health status.  However, none 
of the variables representing husbands’ assets and insurance prices have a significant effect on the 
probabilities on relative four health outcomes at level of .10.   
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On the other hand, the marginal effects of wives’ wealth-related variables, except for 
physical capital and insurance price, correspond with my theoretical expectations of asset-
ownership improving her health status relative to their husbands.  In addition, only wives' human 
capital and physical capital have significant effects on the probabilities of the relative health 
outcomes. When wives have higher health outcomes their husbands, their marginal effect of human 
capital estimates increase the probability of wives' having a relatively higher health outcome than 
their husbands.  Even though the marginal effect estimates of wives' physical capital is significant, 
the general pattern contradicts the theoretical relationship in Section III.  
VI.  Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 The present article analyzes how the role of assets in the context of an intrahousehold 
framework can be a bridge between the literatures of household economics and developmental 
economics.  In the beginning of this article, I presented a literature review that provides further 
insight to how the dynamics of developing economies are closely related to household dynamics in 
the context of gender, assets, and economic and social institutions.  Guided by the survey of both 
literatures, I incorporate endogenous threat points in the marital bargaining framework, and specify 
three important wealth-related variables in the threat points.  With this marital bargaining 
framework, household decision-making processes are linked to the institutional structures of and 
changes in developing countries because economic and social parameters can influence the nature 
and use of husbands' and wives' assets, and hence, both their threat points and bargaining positions.   
I empirically apply my theoretical bargaining framework toward Indonesia by testing whether the 
three wealth-related variables in the hands of husbands and wives affect both of their shares of 
household health resources.  I find that my theoretical bargaining framework has empirical validity 
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that is consistent with the household economic literature and various economic policies.  More 
importantly, I find systematic differences in the way that certain assets held by husbands versus 
wives influences household decision outcomes, which illustrates how economic and social 
institutions affect household dynamics. 
 In my empirical analysis, several results are consistent with my theoretical bargaining 
framework and the past household economic and developmental economic literatures.  First, I find 
that human capital in the hands of wives typically have a statistically significant positive effect on 
their share of household health expenditure, and a statistically significant negative effect on their 
spouse's share of household health expenditure.  Second, I find that physical capital in the hands of 
husbands have a statistically significant positive effect on their share of household health 
expenditure as indicated in table 9.  Third, I find that wives' precautionary assets have a statistically 
significant negative effect on their spouse's share of household health expenditure as indicated in 
table 9. 
 Nevertheless, physical capital in the hands of wives is inconsistent with my theoretical 
bargaining framework by indicating a negative effect on their share of household health 
expenditure.  One possible explanation for this result is that the immobile feature of some physical 
capital allows only one individual after a divorce to possess them.  Thus, an investment in physical 
capital for wives can lower their threat points relative to husbands if wives possess a certain share 
of physical capital during the marriage, but not after a divorce.  Another possible explanation is 
that wives might posses the actual assets, but not the returns of the actual assets.  In this analysis, I 
assume that individuals who possess certain assets also receive the return of those assets.   
However, this assumption may be inappropriate, and the return of wives' assets might strengthen 
their husbands' threat point and health status. 
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 The present article provide us with two important economic policy implications.  The first 
economic policy implication is that the provision of human capital to wives in the household can 
possibly increase their marital bargaining position, which strengthen their "voice" in the household.  
I have illustrated how human capital in hands of wives improve their health status relative to their 
spouse, but human capital can possibly enhance other aspects of their lives.  Moreover, human 
capital in the hands of wives can possibly lower gender inequality within households by elevating 
wives' marital bargaining power.   
 The second policy implication is that effective policies will consider the complexity of the 
interaction between economic and social institutions and household dynamics in developing 
countries.   To help poor people in developing countries, policymakers must assess how economic, 
social, political, and cultural institutions constrain and aid husbands and wives.  With a clearer 
assessment, policymakers can advocate appropriate recommendations for an array of issues like 
gender inequality, poverty, malnutrition, and low educational attainment. 
 In order for the convergence of these two literatures toward each other to continue, further 
research needs to occur.  My first suggestion of further research is the pursue of  how adult 
children as precautionary assets can be incorporate into the marital bargaining framework.  My 
second suggestion of further research is an investigation of how survey designs can better define 
the concepts of human capital, physical capital, and precautionary saving and fully incorporate 
these concepts into a survey.  My third suggestion of further research is a dynamic marital 
bargaining framework that incorporates assets and gender.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1:  Expected Signs of Marginal Effect Estimates for Husbands' Health Outcomes  
             Marginal Effects of Husbands' Health Outcomes
Variables P=[Health =1] P=[Health=2] P=[Health=3] P=[Health=4]
Husbands
Insurance Price - - + +
Precautionary Assets - - + +
Human Capital - - + +
Physical Capital - - + +
Wives
Insurance Price + + - -
Precautionary Assets + + - -
Human Capital + + - -
Physical Capital + + - -
  
 
Table 2:  Expected Signs of Marginal Effect Estimates for Wives' Health Outcomes 
             Marginal Effects of Wives' Health Outcomes
Variables P=[Health =1] P=[Health=2] P=[Health=3] P=[Health=4]
Husbands
Insurance Price + + - -
Precautionary Assets + + - -
Human Capital + + - -
Physical Capital + + - -
Wives
Insurance Price - - + +
Precautionary Assets - - + +
Human Capital - - + +
Physical Capital - - + +
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Table 3:  Summary Table of Husbands' and Wives' Health Outcomes and Assets 
Husbands Wives
Standard Standard
Asset Variables Mean Deviation Median Mean Deviation Median
Health Outcome 2.035 0.449 2 2.0296 0.4835 2 
Health Price 0.172 0.377 0 0.115 0.3196 0 
Human Capital 6.07 4.33 6 5.093 4.04 6 
Physical Capital 1.71 x 10^7 6.65 X 10^7 4.14 x 10^6 8,263,329 6.43 x 10^7 1,437,500 
Precautionary Assets 1,277,646 1.06 x 10^7 287,500 882,579.50 3,337,362 250,000 
 
 
Table 4:  Control Explanatory Variables  
 
 
Variables Specification
age Discrete variable: Years
drural Dichotomous variable:   1=rural & 0=urban
dcjava Dichotomous variable: 1=C. Java & 0=other
dwsumatra Dichotomous variable: 1=W. Sumatra & 0=other
dnsumatra Dichotomous variable: 1=N. Sumatra & 0=other
dssumatra Dichotomous variable: 1=S. Sumatra & 0=other
dlampung Dichotomous variable: 1=Lampung & 0=other
djakarta Dichotomous variable: 1=Jakarta & 0=other
dwjava Dichotomous variable: 1=W. Java & 0=other
dejava Dichotomous variable: 1=E. Java & 0=other
dyogak Dichotomous variable: 1=Yogyakarta & 0=other
dbali Dichotomous variable: 1=Bali & 0=other
dwns Dichotomous variable: 1=W. Nusa Tenggara & 0=other
dskali Dichotomous variable: 1=S. Kalimantan & 0=other
dssulaw Dichotomous variable: 1=S. Sulawesi & 0=other
dislam Dichotomous variable: 1=Islam & 0=other
dcath Dichotomous variable: 1=Protestant & 0=other
dprot Dichotomous variable: 1=Catholic & 0=other
dbudd Dichotomous variable: 1=Buddhism & 0=other
dhind Dichotomous variable: 1=Hinduism & 0=other  
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Table 5: Summary Table of Control Explanatory Variables 
 
                  
         
  Husbands  Wives 
Control Variables  Mean Standard Deviation Median  Mean Standard Deviation Median 
                  
         
Age  44.8 10.28 44  39.5102 9.74 39 
Rural Regions   0.5174 0.494 1  0.5174 0.494 1 
Regions:        
North Sumatra  0.0734 0.2609 0  0.0734 0.2609 0 
West Sumatra  0.0477 0.2133 0  0.0477 0.2133 0 
South Sumatra  0.0487 0.2153 0  0.0487 0.2153 0 
Lampung  0.04152 0.19951 0  0.04152 0.19951 0 
Jakarta  0.0785 0.26895 0  0.0785 0.26895 0 
West Java  0.1584 0.36515 0  0.1584 0.36515 0 
Central Java  0.12815 0.3343 0  0.12815 0.3343 0 
East Java  0.14567 0.3528 0  0.14567 0.3528 0 
Yogyakarta  0.05183 0.2217 0  0.05183 0.2217 0 
Bali  0.058795 0.2353 0  0.058795 0.2353 0 
West Nusa Tenggara  0.06144 0.2402 0  0.06144 0.2402 0 
South Kalimantan  0.050396 0.21879 0  0.050396 0.21879 0 
South Sulawesi   0.05544 0.2289 0  0.05544 0.2289 0 
Religions:        
Islam  0.8721 0.33403 1  0.8721 0.33403 1 
Protestant  0.04368 0.2044 0  0.04368 0.2044 0 
Catholic  0.01848 0.1347 0  0.01848 0.1347 0 
Buddhism  0.00912 0.09507 0  0.00912 0.09507 0 
Hinduism  0.05472 0.22745 0  0.05472 0.22745 0 
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Table 6: Ordered Probit Coefficient Estimates: Dependent variable (Husbands' Health 
Outcomes)  
 
 
B asic Demand Function Ful l  Speci fi cation of Demand Function
Variables Coe fficie nts Standard Errors Coe fficie nts Standard Errors
Hus bands
Insurance Price 0.0698228 0.069511 0.0033831 0.0723096 
P recautionary Assets 2.52 x 10^-10 2.08 x 10^-9 2.11 x 10^-9 2.14 x 10^-9
Human Capital 0.0059501 0.0070565 0.0056812 0.0073741 
P hysical Capital 5.40 x 10^-10 * 3.23 x 10^-10 2.41 x 10^-10 3.44 x 10^-10
Wive s
Insurance Price -0.0842468 0.0802238 -0.0719903 0.0834904 
P recautionary Assets -1.35 x 10^-8 ** 6.89 x 10^-9 -1.72 x 10^-8 *** 6.99 x 10^-9
Human Capital -0.04194 *** 0.00737 -0.0272757 *** 0.0079652 
P hysical Capital 6.90 x 10^-10 7.65 x 10^-10 9.58 x 10^-12 7.99 x 10^-10
Husbands Age ---- ---- -0.0659139 *** 0.0187364 
(Husband Age) ^ 2 ---- ---- 0.0008776 *** 0.000199 
Wive Age ---- ---- 0.0091155 *** 0.0044251 
Re gions
Central Java ---- ---- ---- ----
West Sumatra ---- ---- 0.5365905 *** 0.1133922 
North Sumatra ---- ---- 0.3894948 *** 0.107737 
South Sumatra ---- ---- -0.2397866 ** 0.1111334 
Lampung ---- ---- 0.3868673 *** 0.1185429 
Jakarta ---- ---- 0.1192638 0.0970703 
West Java ---- ---- 0.294349 *** 0.0797834 
East Java ---- ---- -0.590903 *** 0.0797709 
Yogak ---- ---- -0.0143403 0.1115717 
Bali ---- ---- -0.165221 0.1976645 
West North S ---- ---- 0.5454089 *** 0.1013027 
South Kali ---- ---- 0.4058542 *** 0.1103375 
South Sulaw ---- ---- 0.2729725 *** 0.1105857 
Re ligion
Islam ---- ---- ---- ----
P rotestant ---- ---- -0.0582254 0.1162974 
Catholic ---- ---- -0.1607014 0.1659442 
Buddhism ---- ---- -0.0637136 0.2607465 
Hinduism ---- ---- 0.1509591 0.1957637 
Observations 4039 4039 
P seudo R^2 0.0124 0.088 
*     Significance at a = .10
**   Significance at a = .10
*** Significance at a = .10
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Table 7: Ordered Probit Coefficient Estimates: Dependent variable (Wives' Health 
Outcomes)  
 
Basic Demand Function Full Specification of Demand Function
Variables Coefficients Standard Errors Coefficients Standard Errors
Husbands
Insurance Price -0.0385305 0.0672228 -0.0728237 0.0704543 
Precautionary Assets -4.18 x 10 -^10 5.42 x 10 -^10 9.72 x 10 -^10 6.09 x 10 -^10
Human Capital -0.0013736 0.0069323 -0.0058174 0.0072468 
Physical Capital -1.35 x 10 -^10 2.13 x 10 -^10 -5.40 x 10 -^10 ** 2.73 x 10 -^10
Wives
Insurance Price -0.0583988 0.0822359 -0.0441792 0.0846578 
Precautionary Assets 1.26 x 10 -^9 5.96 x 10 -^9 -1.30 x 10 -^9 6.55 x 10 -^9
Human Capital -0.0121724 * 0.0071219 -0.0017736 0.0076022 
Physical Capital -1.88 x 10 -^9 *** 6.04 x 10 -^10 -2.58 x 10 -^9 *** 7.13 x 10 -^10
Husbands Age ---- ---- -0.0186571 0.0165202 
(Husband Age)  ^2 ---- ---- 0.0003981 ** 0.0001893 
Wive Age ---- ---- 0.0012604 0.0041275 
Regions
Central Java ---- ---- ---- ----
West Sumatra ---- ---- 0.2935721 *** 0.0924662 
North Sumatra ---- ---- -0.0921157 0.0955387 
South Sumatra ---- ---- -0.3477335 *** 0.1279532 
Lampung ---- ---- 0.0708364 0.0959845 
Jakarta ---- ---- 0.1026428 0.100979 
West Java ---- ---- -0.0174207 0.074882 
East Java ---- ---- -0.6496563 *** 0.0798185 
Yogak ---- ---- 0.0746396 0.1061044 
Bali ---- ---- 0.0290298 0.165935 
West North S ---- ---- 0.2337653 ** 0.1005759 
South Kali ---- ---- 0.1143229 0.124009 
South Sulaw ---- ---- 0.1170928 0.0960417 
Religion
Islam ---- ---- ---- ----
Protestant ---- ---- 0.1860277 0.1136616 
Catholic ---- ---- -0.0041008 0.1446059 
Buddhism ---- ---- 0.1586326 0.2745305 
Hinduism ---- ---- 0.0543007 0.1554543 
Observations 4058 4058 
Pseudo R^2 0.0048 0.0498 
*     Significance at a = .10
**   Significance at a = .10
*** Significance at a = .10
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Table 8: Ordered Probit Coefficient Estimates: Dependent variable (Relative Marital Health 
Outcomes) 
 
Basic Demand Function Full Specification of Demand Function
Variables Coefficients Standard Errors Coefficients Standard Errors
Husbands
Insurance Price 0.0741868 0.0603346 0.0560741 0.0609322 
Precautionary Assets 4.34 x 10 -^10 8.97 x 10 -^10 4.88 x 10 -^10 9.92 x 10 -^10
Human Capital 0.0026084 0.0066236 0.003647 0.0066984 
Physical Capital 4.60 x 10 -^10 * 2.84 x 10 -^10 4.94 x 10 -^10 * 3.08 x 10 -^10
Wives
Insurance Price 0.0000785 0.07233 -0.0044105 0.0730188 
Precautionary Assets -6.45 x 10 -^9 5.80 x 10 -^9 -6.38 x 10 -^9 5.76 x 10 -^9
Human Capital -0.020176 *** 0.0068363 -0.014928 ** 0.0071776 
Physical Capital 1.85 x 10 -^9 *** 3.96 x 10 -^10 1.73 x 10 -^9 *** 4.18 x 10 -^10
Husbands Age ---- ---- 0.0099205 *** 0.0037556 
Wive Age ---- ---- -0.0047979 0.0039419 
Regions
Central Java ---- ---- ---- ----
West Sumatra ---- ---- 0.131587 0.0917547 
North Sumatra ---- ---- 0.3202968 *** 0.086823 
South Sumatra ---- ---- 0.1128067 0.1142467 
Lampung ---- ---- 0.19221 ** 0.092764 
Jakarta ---- ---- -7.48 x 10 -^6 0.0994056 
West Java ---- ---- 0.191425 *** 0.0668154 
East Java ---- ---- 0.0543307 0.0713349 
Yogak ---- ---- -0.0565479 0.0945612 
Bali ---- ---- -0.129033 0.1447118 
West North S ---- ---- 0.2013109 ** 0.0902778 
South Kali ---- ---- 0.2036517 ** 0.1065131 
South Sulaw ---- ---- 0.0762194 0.0867742 
Religion
Islam ---- ---- ---- ----
Protestant ---- ---- -0.1881986 * 0.102238 
Catholic ---- ---- -0.1224774 0.1393428 
Buddhism ---- ---- -0.1169484 0.2890503 
Hinduism ---- ---- 0.0801656 0.1413447 
Observations 4010 4010 
Pseudo R^2 0.0033 0.0094 
*     Significance at a = .10
**   Significance at a = .10
*** Significance at a = .10
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Table 9: Ordered Probit Marginal Effect Estimates of One-Unit Change in Husbands' and Wives' Assets on Husbands' Health 
Outcomes 
 
Marginal Effects of Husbands' Health Outcomes
Variables P=[Health =1] Z-statistic P=[Health=2] Z-statistic P=[Health =3] Z-statistic P=[Health=4] Z-statistic
Husbands
Insurance Price -0.0098608 -1.04 -0.0035993 -0.83 0.0129 0.98 0.00056 0.91
Precautionary Assets -3.68 x 10^-11 -0.12 -1.05 x 10^-11 -0.12 4.55 x 10^-11 0.12 1.90 x 10^-12 0.12
Human Capital -0.0008694 -0.84 -0.0002484 -0.83 0.001073 0.84 0.0000448 0.82
Physical Capital -7.89 x 10^-11* -1.67 -2.25 x 10^-11 -1.58 9.74 x 10^-11 * 1.67 4.07 x 10^-12 1.52
Wives
Insurance Price 0.0128596 1.00 0.0023187 * 1.77 -0.0145994 -1.09 -0.000579 -1.09
Precautionary Assets 1.98 x 10^-9 ** 1.96 5.65 x 10^-10 * 1.81 -2.44 x 10^-9 ** -1.96 -1.02 x 10^-10 * -1.72
Human Capital 0.0061297 *** 5.65 0.0017514 *** 3.61 -0.0075652 *** -5.62 -0.0003159 *** -3.09
Physical Capital -1.01 x 10^-10 -0.90 -2.87 x 10^-11 -0.88 1.24 x 10^-10 0.90 5.18 x 10^-12 0.87
*     Significance at a =.10 Y = Prob (Health=1) = 0.07818514 Y = Prob (Health=3) = 0.81196499
**   Significance at a =.05 Y = Prob (Health=2) = 0.10743209 Y = Prob (Health=4) = 0.00241778
*** Significance at a =.01
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Table 10: Ordered Probit Marginal Effect Estimates of One-Unit Change in Husbands' and Wives' Assets on Wives' Health 
Outcomes 
 
 
Marginal Effects of Wives' Health Outcomes
Variables P=[Health =1] Z-statistic P=[Health=2] Z-statistic P=[Health =3] Z-statistic P=[Health=4] Z-statistic
Husbands
Insurance Price 0.0044343 0.40 0.0007199 0.47 -0.0049364 -0.41 -0.0001711 -0.41
Precautionary Assets 9.21 x 10^-11 0.27 1.74 x 10^-11 0.27 -1.23 x 10^-11 -0.27 -3.68 x 10^-12 -0.27
Human Capital 0.000237 0.21 -0.0000448 0.21 -0.0002697 -0.21 -9.47 x 10^-6 -0.21
Physical Capital 1.08 x 10^-11 0.20 2.05 x 10^-12 0.841 -1.23 x 10^-11 -0.20 -4.32 x 10^-13 -0.20
Wives
Insurance Price 0.0125031 0.93 0.0013195 * 1.71 -0.0104721 -0.73 -0.0004466 -0.98
Precautionary Assets -2.69 x 10^-10 -0.20 -5.08 x 10^-10 -0.20 3.06 x 10^-10 0.20 1.07 x 10^-12 0.20
Human Capital 0.0125031 * 1.62 0.0003582 1.46 -0.0021553 * -1.62 -0.0000757 -1.45
Physical Capital 2.80 x 10^-10 ** 2.20 5.30 x 10^-11 *** 1.86 3.19 x 10^-10 ** -2.21 -1.12 x 10^-11 * -1.82
*     Significance at a =.10 Y = Prob (Health=1) = 0.08912828 Y = Prob (Health=3) = 0.79785121
**   Significance at a =.05 Y = Prob (Health=2) = 0.11035911 Y = Prob (Health=4) = 0.0021644
*** Significance at a =.01
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Table 11a: Ordered Probit Marginal Effect Estimates of One-Unit Change in Husbands' and Wives' Assets on Relative Marital 
Health Outcomes 
 
Marginal Effects of Relative Marital Health Outcomes
Variables P=[Health =-3] Z-statistic P=[Health=-2] Z-statistic P=[Health =-1] Z-statistic P=[Health=0] Z-statistic
Husbands
Insurance Price 0.000047 -0.74 -0.0011603 -1.05 -0.0124897 -1.04 -0.0012378 -0.63
Precautionary Assets -3.61 x 10^-13 -0.24 -8.79 x 10^-12 -0.24 -9.20 x 10^-11 -0.24 -4.24 x 10^-12 -0.24
Human Capital -1.87 x 10^-6 -0.35 -0.0000456 -0.37 -0.0004769 -0.37 -0.000022 -0.35
Physical Capital 3.45 x 10^-13 -0.84 -8.41 x 10^-12 -1.43 -8.80 x 10^-11 -1.48 -4.06 x 10^-12 -0.83
Wives
Insurance Price -9.03 x 10^-6 -0.16 -0.0002207 -0.16 -0.0023244 -0.16 -0.0001333 -0.13
Precautionary Assets 5.08 x 10^-12 0.67 -1.24 x 10^-10 0.88 1.30 x 10^-9 0.89 5.98 x 10^-11 0.67
Human Capital 0.0000156 0.96 0.0003797 *** 2.70 0.0039748 *** 2.99 -0.0001833 0.96
Physical Capital -1.35 x 10^-12 -0.95 -3.28 x 10^-11 ** -2.43 -3.43 x 10^-10 *** -2.64 -1.58 x 10^-11 -0.95
*     Significance at  a = .10 Y = Prob (Health=-3) = 0.00023954 Y = Prob (Health=-2) = 0.00706447
**   Significance at a = .05 Y = Prob (Health=-1) = 0.12921356 Y = Prob (Health=0) = 0.71749672
*** Significance at a = .01 Y = Prob (Health=1) = 0.13797844 Y = Prob (Health=2) = 0.00728128
Y = Prob (Health=3) = 0.00023876  
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Table 11b: Ordered Probit Marginal Effect Estimates of One-Unit Change in Husbands' and Wives' Assets on Relative Marital 
Health Outcomes 
 
Marginal Effects of Relative Marital Health Outcomes
Variables P=[Health =1] Z-statistic P=[Health=2] Z-statistic P=[Health =3] Z-statistic
Husbands
Insurance Price 0.0136315 0.99 0.0013457 0.95 0.0000621 0.70
Precautionary Assets 9.66 x 10^-11 0.24 9.24 x 10^-12 0.24 3.98 x 10^-13 0.87
Human Capital 0.0005005 0.37 -0.0000479 0.37 2.15 x 10^-6 0.35
Physical Capital 9.24 x 10^-11 1.48 8.84 x 10^-12 1.44 4.16 x 10^-13 0.24
Wives
Insurance Price 0.0024601 0.16 0.0002369 0.16 0.0000107 0.16
Precautionary Assets -1.36 x 10^-9 -0.89 -1.30 x 10^-10 -0.88 1.55 x 10^-12 0.99
Human Capital -0.0041713 *** -2.99 0.000399 *** -2.71 -0.000018 -1.01
Physical Capital 3.60 x 10^-10 *** 2.64 3.45 x 10^-11 ** 2.46 1.55 x 10^-12 0.99
*     Significance at  a = .10
**   Significance at a = .05
*** Significance at a = .01
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Figures 
 
Figure 2:  Marginal Effects of One-Standard Deviation Changes in Husbands’ Assets on 
Predicted Probabilities of Husbands’ Health Outcome 
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Figure 3:  Marginal Effects of One-Standard Deviation Changes in Wives’ Assets on 
Predicted Probabilities of Husbands’ Health Outcome 
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Figure 5:  Marginal Effects of One-Standard Deviation Changes in Husbands’ Assets on 
Predicted Probabilities of Wives’ Health Outcome 
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Figure 6:  Marginal Effects of One-Standard Deviation Changes in Wives’ Assets on 
Predicted Probabilities of Wives’ Health Outcome 
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